If Only I Had Simple Score Voting…

“Daring ideas are like chessmen moved forward. They may be beaten, but they may start a winning game.” — Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

It’s very helpful to expose the fake liberals and the dupe liberals, etc, who infest politics, the media, and the Internet. But nonetheless, they are a small minority. The true Modern Era Liberals are vastly more numerous, but most of them just don’t bother with politics at all. Why should they? They have no power, and they are intelligent enough to realize it’s simply not worth their while. It would be easy to draw the silent modern era liberals (and modern era conservatives also) back into political discourse with one very simple reform. Read more »

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Where The People Are Without Strategy There Is Tyranny

The ruling Western securitary / corporate pirate complex uses the ruse of false national democracy / sovereignty to conceal the tyranny of its masters and to justify its wars. The population is controlled by means of an illusion of self-government that is sustained by two-party / few-party locked-in systems.

The population is mesmerized by “liberalism”, “conservatism”, “Republican / Democrat party” circuses, and an endless number of petty factional disputes. Meanwhile the rulers impose austerity while expending vast resources in their continual quest for world domination. Real democracy would end all of that, so therefore, the pirates will insist that it must never be allowed to come into existence.

In the 21st century, a sudden surge of very heavily financed campaigns have emerged to promote what may be termed “democracy reform”. For now, the great majority of these “reforms” are based on arcane theory-based election methods, which are debated among election method theory analysts. Only recently have reforms, based upon practical methods, begun to be promoted by practical analysts who are overtly concerned for the welfare of the masses.

The famous investigative historian Eric Zuesse has this to say about the current U.S. tyranny:

:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ //
Strategic Culture Foundation — Why Calling US a ‘Democracy’ Is Both False & Dangerous to Do — by Eric Zuesse — 3/15/19
Link

It’s false because it is definitely untrue, and that’s not merely because America has a higher percentage of its residents in prison than does any other nation on this planet, but also because the only scientific studies that have been done of the matter show — they prove — scientifically — that the US is a dictatorship by its very wealthiest residents, against all the rest of the population. Traditionally, that’s called an “aristocracy,” not a democracy, but ever since Mussolini in the 1920s, it came to be called “fascism,” which is the successor to “feudalism” and thus is merely the modernized form of feudalism. What used to be called by such terms as “monarchy” or “aristocracy” is thus now called “fascism” but the leopard is the same regardless of what it is labeled, and what it really is [is] a dictatorship. Mussolini sometimes instead called fascism “corporationism” and it certainly is today’s United States Government, even if some people choose to call it ‘democracy’. It’s what the US Government has been scientifically proven to be: dictatorship, by the richest few (the controlling owners of the international corporations), against the entire public.
// ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:

The common people do of course know that voting, as it is done in the present day (“single-select” or “choose-one” voting), is generally useless, and about half of them do not bother. Even if it was useful, they would only do it because people have a powerful instinct to do things that are personally sacrificial but socially necessary. Voting as it is designed today is useless simply because of the two-party / few-party lock-in effect.

Of course some people in Western culture, due to learned mass assimilatism, will voluntarily flock toward predominant institutions. However, everybody knows that if a Republican, a Democrat, and a “Nader” are available, only the Republican or the Democrat will win, so it is pointless to vote for the “Nader”, since their vote would then merely be sacrificed — it would count for nothing due to the two-party lock-in effect which the single-select system ensures — and they would thereby be deprived of the opportunity to vote for the lesser-evil candidate.

The only way that the voters can overcome two-party lock-in is by utilizing some system of “graded voting” that allows them to give a maximum number of votes to a “Nader”, somewhat fewer votes — or “hedge votes” — to a “lesser evil” predominant party candidate, and no votes at all to a “greater evil” candidate. This is “hedge voting”, and it is the only type of method that allows preference for the “Nader” while requiring only a small sacrifice of the ability to deprive opportunity for the “greater evil” candidate. Since election officials who design ballots and subsequently tabulate votes are never to be trusted too greatly, all aspects of election systems must be designed to operate as simply as possible.

The best system is the strategy-tolerant simple score method which allows voters to grant from (1) to (10) votes (the “score”) to each candidate. The voter who grants (10) votes to a candidate knows that she or he is allotting a 100% portion of assertable support. (8) votes would grant an 80% portion, and so on. As an example of hedge voting, (8) or (9) votes might be granted to a lesser-evil candidate. Obviously, an abstentious “non-grant” of votes would allot (0) votes, and thus no support. This would result in only ten possible vote grants for each candidate. When the election is finished all of the votes are simply added up. This system is “pure-summative”, and its entire tally procedure can be completed locally. The results represent a low quantity of data, which only needs to be passed to larger tabulations once. This would quickly disrupt the two-party lock-in, and thus enable voters to elect officials whom they truly prefer.

Since around the start of the 21st century the ruling Western securitary / corporate pirate complex has been propping up NGOs that tout an “RCV”/”IRV” method (or perhaps more accurately, methods). The “RCV”/”IRV” method is not voting in the ordinary sense because instead of being pure-summative, it is summative-eliminative. The ballot design requires voters to assign one candidate to one “place” — from first to last in a sequence of places — and this is called a “ranked ballot”. It should be obvious that some places should be allowed to be “empty”, with no assigned candidate. In the typically prescribed “RCV”/IRV” method the 1st place votes are summed, and if no one immediately has more than 50% of the total votes, then the candidate with the fewest votes is “eliminated”. And then — on each ballot — the candidate (if any) in the place below the eliminated one is reallocated upward. Presumably, all candidates below the eliminated one are reallocated upward. This process is reiterated until some candidate “wins” over 50% of the votes. Of course if someone does have over 50% of the votes in the first “round” they win with an autochthonous majority — but if elimination rounds are required, they only will “win” with an artificial “majority”. The procedure just prescribed is not the one ordinarily utilized in practice; it usually must be modified or constrained in some severe fashion. It is completely unrealistic to suppose that any “RCV”/”IRV” method not drastically constrained will ever be reasonably amenable to hand-counted paper ballots in modern times.

“RCV”/”IRV” methods are not strategy-tolerant in any positive sense; but they are in strategy-tolerant for various negative purposes. The previously mentioned “score” method has often been criticized for violating the “later-no-harm” principle — that is, it is possible for a lesser-evil candidate to win due to voters granting her or him any votes, even if less votes are granted to them than to other most-preferred candidates. But this is really not a significant concern. Also, “bullet voting”, where a voter grants only one vote to only one candidate is an an extremely poor strategy for the score method — hedge voting is the actual very good strategy. However, bullet voting is a very good strategy for “RCV”/”IRV” voting. This is because “RCV”/”IRV” always violates the “sooner-no-harm” principle. With that method, any candidate granted 1st place automatically diminishes the chance to win for all candidates granted lower places in the sequence of “ranks” — even though those candidates may be virtually as much preferred as the 1st placed one (these are sometimes called “clone” candidates). This is an invitation to chaos since a great number of “clone” candidates can mutually eliminate each other, and then some almost universally unfavored candidate can win, due to the “bullet” votes of some very small minority. “RCV”/”IRV” voting is truly full of unexpectable quagmires.

Ranked voting ballots are by no means exclusively applicable to only the “RCV”/”IRV” vote tallying method. The very same ballot design could be utilized for “simple ranked voting”. Simple ranked voting is very simple. Voters cast votes on a ranked place ballot in accordance with their intentions: =/ 1st > 2nd > 3rd > 4th… /=. Only one candidate (or no candidate at all) may be chosen for each place. The 1st place candidate is granted 10 votes, 2nd place gets 9 votes, 3rd place gets 8 votes, and so on. The 10th place candidate is granted 1 vote, and any further places are granted no votes. All of the votes are simply added up, and the candidate who was granted the most votes is the winner. Absolutely nothing is done to interfere with the voters’ use of the hedge strategy, so this tallying method would be very disruptive of two-party lock-in, even though it would be less responsive than the simple score system.

All that the voters need is the ability to cast one vote to determine whether the “RCV”/”IRV” vs, the “simple ranked” tallying method will be utilized. Of course they will eventually decide to avoid the many pitfalls of the former method.

There exists an “approval” voting method whereby voters may choose to “approve” or refrain from “approving” any number of candidates, and all of the “approve” votes are simply summed up. However, this method does not enable use of the hedge strategy, so it will not ensure abolition of two party lock-in.

It is entirely possible to transform any pure-summative election method into a multi-winner proportional representation election method. That is, there is a method for implementing a proportional representation (multiple winner) election (e.g. for a legislature) without the involvement of parties using any such method:

“Tranches” correspond to seats in a legislature, but also, approximately, to non-majority groups or interests. Here are the fundamental parameters and variables (through utilization of the concept of “tranches — which provide a kind of “curved score”):

S = The total number of seats to be filled, which will equal the number of “tranches” or “layers”.

N = A tranche Number (these tranche numbers run from 0 to (S – 1) The “strongest winner” is in the topmost tranche, and the tranches form “layers,” with tranche #0 occupied by the strongest winner, tranche #1 below tranche #0, tranche #2 below tranche #1, and so on down to #(S – 1).

W = The strongest Winner’s total number of votes.

C = The “tranche ceiling”, or end point at the top of each tranche (to be determined for each given N (tranche number), by the equation below).

C = W*(1 – (N/S)^2)

Example:

Strongest winner’s total = 310

Total number of tranches = 8 (For a total number of seats = 8. And the bottomost tranche = 7)

For each tranche number (N) there is a calculated ceiling number (C):

C = 310 * (1 – (N/8)^2)

(C must be rounded off — banker’s rounding is recommended.)

As described above, this proportional method would lead to serious problems due to effectively random outcomes. However, these problems effectively vanish if a “paladin preservation” technique is employed. With this, any incumbent candidate who receives enough votes to whichever tranche they already occupy (presumably this would be a “paladin” with an well-liked established track record) will win that tranche once again, even if some other candidates would otherwise win it. This might appear to “fly in the face” of the common notion of “toss the rascals out”, but improved election methods would remove the “rascals” automatically in any case.

Election method theory analysts have observed that this proportional method violates all sorts of (seemingly) important principles; but practical analysts will observe that it will nonetheless “just work”, and will assure proportional representation strong enough to obviate the need for redistricting in many cases.

In the end, the true Silver Bullet that will abolish faulty election methods will be the ability of voters to vote for the method that is to be employed in the following election. Even the old “select one” method would likely be sufficient for this.

RCV And The Elite Party Capture Effect

I began studying election methods during the 2004 pre-election season. I blogged on perhaps 50 sites, and may even have originated the term “spoiler effect.” My first attempt to cure the spoiler effect was “Consecutive Runoff Approval Voting”. See:
Consecutive Runoff Approval Voting.

Some of my “criteria” include:

There must be simple hand counted paper ballots, with absolutely no casting or counting automation, and any election method must be simple enough to tabulate to enable this. Machines that most voters perceive to be operated via “black magic” can never be trusted. Any proper election method should be simple enough to enable this.

Any proposed election method should thoroughly disrupt the spoiler effect, and thus disrupt the “two-party-system,” which essentially becomes a “one-party-system.”

It is necessary to take account of the fact that elections are not primarily contests between opposing candidates, or even opposing ideals. Rather they are contests between the common voters and a ruthless ruling establishment. This causes election methods to become very complicated when the support of so-called “honest voters” is assumed as a criteria. Everything will become much simpler if voters are expected to vote strategically. After all, the ruling establishment will always act strategically.

I at first began with the realization that “IRV” could never be implemented without the utilization of automated election devices (e.g. voting machines), whereas score/range, could. So in 2004 I began blogging relentlessly in opposition to “IRV.”

My opponents were “rabid” promoters of “IRV”, and they offered all sorts of spurious, contradictory, and sometimes blatantly dishonest reasons why “IRV” would disrupt the “two party system,” and I began to realize that election automation was not nearly the whole problem with “IRV,” which began to display numerous pathologies. At the end of this article I will illustrate one of them.

Of course, the most pervasive election method circa 2018 is single selection voting (usually absurdly called “plurality voting”). This dreadful method blatantly imposes a “spoiler effect.” This was vividly illustrated in the year 2000 presidential election when it was claimed that Nader spoiled the election for Gore, and G. W. Bush eventually won. The “IRV” promoters began speciously claiming that “IRV” removes the spoiler effect (and most of them still do claim that). And the spoiler effect concept is rather difficult to define when one is dealing with RCV/”IRV” voting methods.

Eventually, it became clear that many of the real pathologies of the various election methods are almost impossible to discern unless one takes into account an “elite party capture effect.” In fact, the perspective on all of the issues regarding election methods transforms radically once one begins analyzing elections as contests between common individual’s interests and elite’s interests. For example, in the year 2000 election Bush and Gore were clearly elite-linked candidates, and Nader was perceived as the common people-linked spoiler for the (perceived lesser evil) Gore.

From my perspective, the truth is that it is not necessary to utilize a great number of arcane concepts in the evaluation of election methods. Many (including modern RCV methods) of the are far too complex to be utilized without automation. Even those that are easy to explain are often not simple to implement, and the notion of “expressiveness” is not a simple concept either. Prime numbers are very simple to describe. The numbers (2), (3), (5), (7), (11), (13)… are prime because they can only be divided, with no resulting additional fractions, by themselves or by (1). And all the other numbers between (2) and (13) are non-prime. This notion of prime numbers that cannot be divided with no resulting additional fractions is “dirt-simple,” yet it leads to many of the most complex challenges in mathematics. Merely because something is easy to describe by no means implies that it will not create infinitely complex structures.

The “expressiveness” notion is not so simple as to imply that the information entered into a system correlates with the degree of control available to the one who enters it. If I give you a lottery ticket with ten digits that will be chosen at random tomorrow, would I be offering anything more If I allowed you to chose five of the digits?

All ranked choice voting methods have been historically shown to have multiple pathologies that always result in elite party capture, which is, in reality, aristocratic dictatorship.

Compare this with strategic hedge simple score voting. With this, you could allot, say, between (1) and (10) votes to each of as many candidates as you wish (but you couldn’t spend an eternity in the voting booth). (No, we are not talking about what has been called “cumulative voting”, whereby each voter is allotted a fixed number of points which they may distribute.) You could allot Nader (10) votes, and allot Gore (7), (8), or (9) votes, and so by voting for Nader, you would still not be sacrificing all of the votes you would prefer to allot to Gore as the “lesser evil.” This is where you would be using the strategic hedge strategy. There would be no (0) vote that ballot publishers could use to waste time looking for mistakes, which might be ruled to result in discarded “spoiled ballots.” There would merely be “abstemious non-votes” whereby candidates would be ignored. There is no point in ceding power to ballot publishers.

This is much better than approval voting, which simply eliminates the option to use the strategic hedge strategy. Everybody could cast one vote for Nader and also one vote for Gore, but the result would simply be a close “toss-up.” Or you could “vote your (foolish) conscience” only for Nader, but the individual next to you might be casting his/her vote only for Gore. This represents the double bind quandary whereby it is a fair likelihood that we would never ever see a Nader win. Approval voting could produce a fair likelihood that a common people-linked candidate might never win.

What is called STAR voting looks like score/range voting with a second consecutive round to produce nothing more than a (fake) “majority winner.”

If you don’t believe all this, take a look at:
Why Greens need range voting
https://www.rangevoting.org/ForGreens.html

Below I have worked out an example of one of the major pathologies of “IRV” voting. As a mere example, it’s more than just a “vignette.” It is not explained in as much detail as I would prefer. And it’s very easy to make silly mistakes in such exercises, so feel free to point out any.

Ranked Choice Voting fails through “bullet voting”. Voters are numbered 1 through 28. Candidates are designated A through Z. Candidates within parentheses are the ones that get eliminated.

=-=-=-=-=-=

1: A>F>B>C>D>E –> 1xA

2: B>(A)>C>D>E
3: B>(A)>C>D>E –> 2xB [A and then F are eliminated.]

4: C>(A)>(B)>D>E
5: C>(A)>(B)>D>E
6: C>(A)>(B)>D>E –> 3xC

7: D>(A)>(B)>(C)>E
8: D>(A)>(B)>(C)>E
9: D>(A)>(B)>(C)>E
10: D>(A)>(B)>(C)>E –> 4xD

11: E>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)
12: E>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)
13: E>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)
14: E>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)
15: E>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D) –> 5xE

16: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E)
17: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E)
18: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E)
19: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E)
20: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E)
21: G>(A)>(B)>(C)>(D)>(E) –> 6xG

22: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Y)>(Z)
23: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Y)>(Z)
24: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Y)>(Z)
25: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Y)>(Z)
26: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(Z)
27: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Y)
28: T>(U)>(V)>(W)>(X)>(Z) –> 7xT
=-=-=-=-=-=

First Round eliminates A.
Next Round eliminates F.
Next Round eliminates B.
Next Round eliminates C.
Next Round eliminates D.
Next Round eliminates E.
Next Round eliminates F.
Next Round eliminates G.
Since U~Z are always ranked below T, they are eliminated in various rounds.
T wins.

21 voters voted for “clones” A through G, all of which got eliminated.
7 voters voted for “clones” T through Z.

T wins, with a 7 to 6 “majority”. Note that 28/7 = 4, thus the T~Z minority interest prevailed over the A~G majority interest despite a 1 to 4 ratio.
_____

The Unrealistic Circumscribed Speculations Of Feckless Election Methods Cognoscenti

95% of all the calamitous “problems” that we, most unfortunately, feel a need to discuss here, could presumably have been avoided if we had such a thing as democracy in the U.S.A. (and elsewhere too). But we are stuck with a “choose-one” voting method, which automatically results in a “spoiler effect” that causes it to be pointless to vote for candidates of small parties, other than the major two parties, that are not backed by the entrenched political apparatus. Also, it surely must be obvious that we need decentralized hand counting of paper ballots, with results announced prior to being sent to larger counting centers — we must not use voting machines of any kind.

For the last 13 years I have been studying election methods to find a method that can effectively disrupt the spoiler effect, and thus the two-party “system”. There is a method called “ranked voting” (“IRV” is a form of this) which is being promoted by giant corporate think tank. If anything, it is much worse than choose-one voting. It has been described by blogger Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com as a virus. Then there is something called “approval voting”, whereby the voter can give (or withhold) one vote to (or from) as many candidates as they wish. This is rather lame and does not mitigate the spoiler effect very much. At the end of the day, “strategic hedge simple score voting” is really the only thing that can work effectively. Yet it is ignored by the feckless election methods cognoscenti.

Here is some email material between myself and Warren D. Smith at The Center for Election Science (a “Google Group”):
https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!forum/electionscience

(I have already posted some of it at the Moon of Alabama website.)

/~~~~~~~~~~
email — [blues]
Apr 6 (10 days ago)

Sent
From:
[blues]
To:
[warren d smith]
Subject:
Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting Is The ONLY Method That. . .
Date:
Thursday, April 06, 2017 6:42 AM
Size:
1 KB

. . . .does not treat elite interest involved elections as if they were
casual “hobby club” elections. Therefor it is able to effectively
disrupt the spoiler effect, and thus, the two-party “system”.

The Approval method is inadequately differentiative for degree of
preference, and thus cannot support any strategy to overcome the spoiler
effect. Other methods are more complex, and increased complexity,
however slight, generally leads to follow-on dilemmas that favor the
strategies of the elites. The Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting
method is the only one that can effectively overcome elite strategies.

You might be interested in my post at:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/04/ignoring-the-people-where-the-left-of-the-aisle-side-fails.html#c6a00d8341c640e53ef01b7c8ea4d7b970b

Thank you in advance for your kind attention.

Sincerely,

blues
\~~~~~~~~~~

Reply from W. D. Smith:
/~~~~~~~~~~
email — Warren D Smith
Apr 6 (10 days ago)

From:
Warren D Smith
To:
[blues]
Subject:
Re: Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting Is The ONLY Method That. . .
Date:
Thursday, April 06, 2017 1:23 PM
Size:
7 KB

On 4/6/17, [blues] wrote:

. . . .does not treat elite interest involved elections as if they were
casual “hobby club” elections. Therefor it is able to effectively
disrupt the spoiler effect, and thus, the two-party “system”.

The Approval method is inadequately differentiative for degree of
preference, and thus cannot support any strategy to overcome the spoiler
effect. Other methods are more complex, and increased complexity,
however slight, generally leads to follow-on dilemmas that favor the
strategies of the elites. The Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting
method is the only one that can effectively overcome elite strategies.

You might be interested in my post at:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/04/ignoring-the-people-where-the-left-of-the-aisle-side-fails.html#c6a00d8341c640e53ef01b7c8ea4d7b970b

Thank you in advance for your kind attention.
blues
–Wonder what [blues] is talking about?
Consulting said post, he wrote in his key paragraph:

QUOTE
Strategic hedge simple score voting can be described in one simple
sentence: Strategically bid no vote at all for undesired candidates
(ignore them as though they did not exist), or strategically cast from
one to ten votes (or five to ten votes, for easier counting) for any
number of candidates you prefer (up to some reasonable limit of, say,
twelve candidates, so people don’t hog voting booths), and then simply
add all the votes up.
END QUOTE

Well, not exactly a “simple sentence,” sorry.
I do not know what he meant. It seems like he meant either
(a) What I call “score voting” aka “range voting,” sum-based version:
Each ballot provides a numerical score for each and every candidate
on an 0-9 scale;
candidate with highest sum of scores wins; treat unscored candidates
as scored 0 by that ballot.

or
(b) What has been called “cumulative voting”:
Same as (a) except the sum of all the scores on your ballot is
required to be <=10.

Either interpretation, I fail to see the “strategic hedge” new
contribution, if any.

Cumulative voting is neither as good nor as simple as range voting.
And I think average-based scoring, with unscored candidates
treated as “unscored” not as “0,”
is superior to the sum-based version in (a) above.

In any case I would recommend to [blues] that he actually clearly state
what the hell he is
talking about, in step-by-step fashion that is absolutely impossible
to misinterpret. Rather than just spew enthusiastic incoherence.


Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org
\~~~~~~~~~~

/~~~~~~~~~~
(Original comment at MoA):

Of the now literally hundreds of “fancy” voting methods all over the Internet, Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting is the only one that specifically enables the common voters to win elections against the two-party empowered deep state. All of the many others treat elite interest involved elections as if they were casual “hobby club” elections. These distracting, ill-considered, unworkable election methods are the products of a booming academic “industry” erected by a large contingent of “election methods cognoscenti”. If the common voters are to ever defeat the elite deep state apparatus which will, of course, always utilize strategy, those common voters must have the ability to effectively vote strategically.

Too bad we don’t have simple score voting. Then we could give between 1 and 10 votes to many candidates. But no votes at all for Hillary the war monger. We might place 8 “hedge” votes for Bernie (since he is less bad than Hillary (or more accurately, was previously though to be)), 10 write-in votes for Jesse Ventura, and 10 write-in votes for Dennis Kucinich.

Strategic hedge simple score voting can be described in one simple sentence: Strategically bid no vote at all for undesired candidates (ignore them as though they did not exist), or strategically cast from one to ten votes (or five to ten votes, for easier counting) for any number of candidates you prefer (up to some reasonable limit of, say, twelve candidates, so people don’t hog voting booths), and then simply add all the votes up.

We must also abolish deep state subvertible election machines (“computer voting”), and get back to hand counted paper ballots, with results announced at each polling station just prior to being sent up to larger tabulation centers.

It should be obvious that congresspeople and presidents should be limited to one-year terms of office.

The Direct Democracy (e.g. Liquid Democracy) advocated by Iceland’s Pirate Party (and Jackrabbit) may also represent a very beneficial alternative to the spoiler effect imposing choose-one method. See:

How the German Pirate Party’s “Liquid Democracy” Works
http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/22154/how-german-pirate-partys-liquid-democracy-works

Posted by: blues | Apr 6, 2017 5:34:35 AM | 16
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/04/ignoring-the-people-where-the-left-of-the-aisle-side-fails.html#c6a00d8341c640e53ef01b7c8ea4d7b970b
\~~~~~~~~~~

I responded 6 days ago, but have not heard back in any way:
/~~~~~~~~~~
Further Reasons {1}
[blues]
Apr 10 (6 days ago)
to [warren d smith]
Sent

Subject:
Further Reasons {1}
Date:
Monday, April 10, 2017 10:00 PM
Size:
2 KB

I painstakingly shun “social media” such as Facebook, Google Plus, etc. in order to make a token defense of what remains of my privacy.

Strategic Hedge Simple Score Voting is indeed not technically distinct from Score (or Range) voting, except for some inconspicuous details that are mandated by its special objectives. Its objectives include:

(+) It must effectively disrupt the spoiler effect, and thus end the two-party system.
(+) It must be very resistant to the influence of the entrenched political apparatus.
(+) It must be, and also give the appearance of being, very simple and comprehensible.
(+) It must be completely compatible with the decentralized hand counting of paper ballots.

For example, the possible votes on a ballot are: Ignore a candidate on the ballot as if they did not exist; give from one (or, say, five) to ten votes to a candidate on the ballot; or write in a candidate and similarly give from one (or, say, five) to ten votes to that candidate. And that is all.

Why give from one (or, say, five) to ten votes rather than give from zero to nine votes? Well, the common voters must employ strategy if they are to defeat the entrenched political apparatus. And having ten as the greatest vote simplifies this strategy, since giving eight votes is clearly seen to produce a sacrifice of 20% of the influence of a given vote entry, giving six votes produces a sacrifice of 40%, etc.

There is no point in offering a “zero” vote. It only invites election officials (the entrenched political apparatus) to demand a “full ballot”. Thus tossing out votes of those who are too dignified to cast “zero” votes (blaming with faint praise).

(To be continued.)

See:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/04/open-thread-2017-14.html#c6a00d8341c640e53ef01bb098f2c38970d

Thank you again,
[blues]
\~~~~~~~~~~

I hope this is not too long and confusing. However THIS is how we ended up with candidates such as Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump! Meanwhile, these election methods cognoscenti continue with their “intellectual glass bead game”, playing in their “operative election methods tar pit”. These people are teaching useless college courses and spilling endless digital ink at Wikipedia while war horses breed at the border!

After The 2016 Election, Simple Score Voting Matters More Than Ever!

We must get strategic hedge simple score voting. Nothing else will beat the spoiler effect induced “two-party” “system”!

Christmas Is Great. Now Let’s Upgrade Groundhog Day!

::: by blues :::

I live in the Northern U.S., where:

“What you can’t thrive in is the freaking cold and its crappy rainy snowy weather and bad road conditions and whatnot. Food doesn’t grow, it runs and you have to chase it through mud and cold and blah, screw it all. Give me summer any day. The four seasons should be called Spring, Summer, Fall, and Hell.” — Graham Bradley

And winter hell really begins in earnest on Dec 25th — Christmas Day. It just does. And it ends 82 days later, on March 17th — Saint Patrick’s Day. So the half-way mark is 41 days. Well, Groundhog Day is 39 days later, on February 2nd, which is close enough. (Forget Valentine’s Day, 51 days later; all that sugar is bad for you.) If the celebration of Groundhog Day was as important as Christmas, which it should be, the mid-winter hell would be far more bearable.

So it is most important to build up the celebration of Groundhog Day! (The groundhog is really a huge squirrel that burrows in the earth.) Take the day off. Scatter nuts and raisins out for the hungry critters. Sing groundhog chants at the town hall.

This would make everything so much better!

Maybe We Could Start Here

Groundhog Day Festival Site:
http://www.groundhog.org/

Recipe for a Groundhog Day “Dirt” Feast:

1 3/4 cups water
1 cup BLACK rice (some black rice is sticky, and is thus said to be “glutinous,” but it contains no actual gluten. It will blacken the other ingredients.)
1 cup chopped onion
2 tablespoon olive oil or butter
1 cup sliced celery
1 cup chopped mushrooms
1/2 teaspoon salt

Cook together like rice until the rice is done. Easy.

(By clicking HERE you can read or write comments below.)

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Germany Has Party List Proportional Representation. Too Bad

::: by blues :::

With Germany’s party list proportional representation (List PR) in the Bundestag, the most significant legislative body in Germany, the voters only get to vote for parties (a feature of proportional representation) rather than candidates. Generally, the actual representatives are chosen by party bosses, not by the people. The Germans despise quite a lot of what their so-called “elected” government does. But they have no real say.

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ACE Electoral Knowledge Network — Advantages and disadvantages of List PR
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd02/esd02c/esd02c01/

Disadvantages of List PR:

[….]

Excessive entrenchment of power within party headquarters and in the hands of senior party leaderships—especially in closed-list systems. A candidate’s position on the party list, and therefore his or her likelihood of success, is dependent on currying favour with party bosses, while their relationship with the electorate is of secondary importance. In an unusual twist to the List PR system, in Guyana parties publish their list of candidates not ranked but simply ordered alphabetically. This allows party leaders even more scope to reward loyalty and punish independence because seats are only allocated to individuals once the result of the vote is known.

[….]
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(By clicking HERE you can read or write comments below.)

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We Ain’t Got No Workers No More — Simply Demand Power!

::: by blues :::

Please forget about the “worker power” baloney. They are an historical artifact; They don’t exist anymore. In the U.S. today, you are damn lucky to get $7.25 per hour, with no “benefits.” And you’re really lucky if it’s 40 hours. But most of us don’t really get even that. This is because, since Reagan and Clinton we have FREE trade, so we we get to compete with the Chinese Foxconn workers who have to be restrained from jumping to their deaths with huge nets. So there are no longer enough indispensable workers to protest their political rape by means of general strikes. Do yourself and every one a favor, and give the power back to the masses. If you can’t trust the masses who can you trust?

The supreme court? HAHAHAHAHA! They protect ONE minority — the 1%, and give to gays on the same day that they take back from blacks, and vice versa. Get a simple type of score voting — it really is that simple. Learn about and demand the simple (and well-known to some) score voting method. Get rid of single-selection voting. IRV voting, for example, has been funded by Soros, Rockefeller Bros., Carnegie-Mellon, Ford foundation, etc. Yet even Ralph Nader has been duped into supporting it! IRV makes artful (strategic) voting impossible. With that, if you “rank” Nader one notch above Gore (no “hero” for sure), and Gore gets 50% of the vote (but not quite 50% +1), then in the next cycle, the biggest loser’s hero gets “eliminated” and their votes get advanced to their second (ranked) choice, and Nader gets 51% of the vote, but Bush gets 53%, and thus wins! (The percentages can add up to more than 100.) (And since you are not among the eliminated biggest losers, your second-rank choice is just tossed out anyway.) This is even worse than our current single-selection (so-called “plurality”) voting method.

Compare simple score voting with all the other methods. You get to give from 1 to 10 votes to each of up to maybe 20 candidates. Simple paper ballots may simply be added up by hand counting — no riggable vote casting or counting machines are needed. This encourages artful (strategic) voting. If you give some candidate 8 or 9 votes instead of 10, you know that you will only sacrifice 20% or 10% of your vote for him or her. This eliminates the spoiler effect by at least 90%, which is far better than what any other (reasonably simple) method achieves. You don’t need to be any mathematician to see how much simpler this is than all the other convoluted methods!

This would completely end the two-party system. There would be few or no more corrupt Democrats and Republicans.

All of the fancy election methods websites insist on artless (“honest,” “sincere,” “vote your conscience”) voting. Only lowly voters are required to sustain such a level of absurd “integrity” by all the “election methods” websites (except mine). If you go to an auction, do you refuse to bid less than what you think an item is worth?

Political scientists have known about the power of simple score voting for hundreds of years. They have perpetrated the biggest conspiracy in history.

(By clicking HERE you can read or write comments below.)

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